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The Paramilitary Power That Became a State: Inside the RSF

ANALYSIS // SUDAN // Over the past year, Sudan’s paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has carried out some of the most brutal atrocities against civilians in the country’s modern history. Cities such as El Fasher and Nyala in the Darfur region have become synonymous with massacres, looting, and sexual violence reminiscent of the darkest chapters of Sudan’s civil war.

But the RSF is not a random insurgent group. It is the product of decades of political cynicism, economic opportunism, and a security apparatus that lost control of its own creation. It has also become geopolitically significant for Abu Dhabi, which has been eager to define its own sphere of influence on the African continent.

Origins: from Janjaweed to RSF

The RSF traces its roots to the notorious Janjaweed militias, mobilised in 2003 by the regime of Omar al-Bashir to crush rebellions in Darfur. Composed largely of Arab nomadic tribes armed by the government, the Janjaweed were unleashed against ethnic groups suspected of supporting the insurgency. The result was a humanitarian catastrophe: more than 300,000 people killed and millions displaced, according to the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR).

In 2013, Bashir moved to formalise this militia under state control, creating the Rapid Support Forces.
Officially, it was placed under the intelligence services, but in practice it became a private army loyal to one man: Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.

Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, a.k.a Hemedti. Wikimedia Commons

Hemedti quickly rose through the ranks, becoming one of the regime’s most indispensable figures, tasked with securing borders, suppressing dissent, and preserving Bashir’s rule. In return, he gained access to vast resources: gold mines, customs revenues, and foreign financing.

When Bashir was ousted during the popular uprising of 2019, Hemedti and his troops were already positioned to fill the power vacuum. The RSF had evolved from a militia under military command into a state within the state, with its own revenue streams, intelligence networks, and command structure largely independent of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Ideology and self-perception

The RSF lacks a coherent ideology in any traditional sense. It is not driven by religion, like the Islamic State, nor by ethnic autonomy, like many of Africa’s insurgent movements. Its existence is built on power, loyalty, and economic survival. Its website, although not updated since last year, does provide a fascinating look into the dynamics and self-perception of the organisation. With border control and protection of civilians as one of the dominant features.

In its own rhetoric, the RSF portrays itself as the protector of the nation, a stabilising force in a fractured state. In reality, it functions as an instrument of control: a power-political tool that converts military strength into political leverage.

Financing and international networks

The RSF’s financial network is vast and transnational. According to Human Rights Watch and Reuters, the group derives significant income from gold mines in Darfur and central Sudan, with much of the gold exported through the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Gold has become the lifeblood of the organisation, extracted under brutal conditions in RSF-controlled mines, smuggled out of the country, and laundered in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. The profits are reinvested in weapons, vehicles, and logistics.

The UN Panel of Experts on Sudan has reported that the UAE sees Hemedti as a valuable ally in the struggle for influence around the Red Sea, providing both financial and logistical backing to the RSF. This support reflects not only economic interests but also strategic intent: to create a buffer against Iranian and Turkish expansion in the region.

RSF in Yemen: mercenaries of the Gulf

The RSF’s involvement abroad reveals its transformation from a local militia into a commercialised military enterprise, a Sudanese counterpart to Russia’s Wagner Group.
Between 2015 and 2019, thousands of RSF fighters were deployed to Yemen as part of the Saudi-led coalition against the Iran-backed Houthi movement.

According to The New York Times and the BBC, many of these fighters were recruited from Darfur and sent as paid mercenaries, financed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
They were deployed to the frontlines around Hodeidah and Aden, facing extreme conditions and high casualties. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the arrangement offered access to cheap, expendable manpower.
For Hemedti, it provided foreign currency, military experience, and international recognition.
As Human Rights Watch notes, Hemedti channelled much of the Yemen revenue into building a private business empire that continues to bankroll the RSF’s domestic operations. The Yemen campaign marked a turning point: the RSF evolved from a domestic security force into a regional actor with direct ties to the Gulf monarchies.

Abu Dhabi and the battle for influence

To understand the RSF’s endurance, and the political cover it enjoys, one must look to Abu Dhabi.
Under Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), the UAE has integrated Sudan into its broader Africa strategy, using the country as a platform for influence across the Horn of Africa.

In Hemedti’s logic, violence is not a failure of governance; it is governance by other means.

As analyses from Chatham House and The Financial Times highlight, Emirati support for the RSF is less about ideology than about strategic differentiation. Abu Dhabi is seeking to define an independent foreign policy, distinct from Saudi Arabia’s regional hegemony.

Since the Yemen intervention, the divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi has widened.
While Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) in Riyadh has focused on diplomacy and religious legitimacy, MBZ has pursued military technology, trade corridors, and control over key maritime routes.
Sudan fits squarely into this ambition: it sits on the Red Sea, one of the world’s most critical shipping lanes, and serves as a gateway to both East and Central Africa.

Support for Hemedti offers Abu Dhabi indirect access to resources, territories, and networks, without the political cost of overt military intervention.
According to Reuters, since 2021 the UAE has imported Sudanese gold at volumes suggesting deep economic entanglement, often routed through RSF-controlled supply chains.

As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observed:

“The UAE is not merely supporting the RSF for profit — it is crafting a shadow foreign policy that prioritises control, influence, and plausible deniability.”
(Quoted in Middle East Eye)

Why the violence against civilians?

The massacres in El Fasher, Nyala, and Geneina are not random acts of brutality. They form part of the RSF’s strategy of control. Civilian terror serves a political purpose: to depopulate contested areas, dissolve resistance, and consolidate territorial dominance. Violence against civilians becomes a currency — looting, extortion, and control of humanitarian aid are used to fund operations and reward loyalty.
In Hemedti’s logic, violence is not a failure of governance; it is governance by other means.

International response and the economy of war

The international community has repeatedly condemned the RSF’s actions, unfortunately to very little effect. Targeted sanctions have symbolic weight but no deterrent value. UN warnings of “possible crimes against humanity” have been drowned out by diplomatic inertia, as major powers protect their own interests. The United States has avoided confrontation with the UAE; the EU has struggled to balance humanitarian imperatives with its desire for stability in the region.
According to Amnesty International, the RSF has, since 2023, conducted systematic attacks on civilians — including mass rapes, village burnings, and extrajudicial killings.

The RSF survives not merely because of foreign financing, but because Sudan’s systemic corruption and war economy sustain it. The militia is both a symptom and a driver of that structure, one in which power is self-perpetuating, and accountability nonexistent.

As long as external funding, political pragmatism, and strategic denial continue to converge, the RSF will persist, not as a rebellion, but as a governing force in its own right.
In Sudan today, violence has become the language of power, and silence the only armistice left.

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For this article, I used the following sources: