IRAN//ANALYSIS// The ongoing protests in Iran over recent days once again demonstrate that Iran’s civilian population is prepared to confront a political system that has lost any meaningful connection with the society it governs. This time, the protests have spread from the capital to much of the country.
Iran has witnessed repeated waves of protest in recent years, most notably following the authorities’ killing of the young Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in 2022. At that time, the rallying cry was “Woman, Life, Freedom.”
The current protests, which began on 28 December 2025, are more firmly rooted in the country’s acute economic crisis: soaring inflation of 42 per cent and a dramatic depreciation of the national currency, the rial, which has severely eroded purchasing power. The initial demonstrations were led by shopkeepers in Tehran, who closed their businesses in protest against the currency collapse. Among the earliest slogans heard were: “Death to the dictator” and “The mullahs must go.”
The protests are not solely a reaction to catastrophic economic conditions. They are also directed against the pervasive corruption that has come to define the Iranian state.
The economic core of the protests is most clearly expressed in a slogan that has gained prominence as the demonstrations have gathered momentum: “Not for Gaza, not for Lebanon – my heart for Iran.” This is a direct reference to widespread perceptions that Iranian authorities have channelled more than one billion US dollars to Hezbollah within a single year—funds that could instead have been allocated to Iran’s own population, already strained by international sanctions. Whereas earlier protest movements often focused on subsidies and the cost of living, today’s economic grievances are closely intertwined with demands for dignity, rights, and political representation.
In this sense, protests over economic hardship are inherently political—and therefore far more threatening to the system itself. President Masoud Pezeshkian has urged the authorities to engage in dialogue over what he has termed the protesters’ “legitimate demands.” To date, eight people have reportedly been killed in connection with the unrest.
Since US President Donald Trump assumed office in January 2025, economic sanctions against Iran have been further tightened. Iran is now internationally isolated and effectively cut off from global financial markets. These sanctions, however, do not primarily affect the political elite or the regime itself. Instead, they disproportionately impact the civilian population—particularly the large middle class, which for many years has functioned as a buffer between the ruling elite and wider society. It is this group that has once again initiated the current wave of protests.
Corruption remains a central grievance. There is a profound lack of transparency regarding the allocation and use of public funds, and particularly where these resources ultimately end up. This criticism is especially directed at the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which plays a decisive role in managing large segments of the Iranian economy.
The Revolutionary Guard: political linchpin and economic bulwark
There are no official figures detailing the precise extent of the IRGC’s control over Iran’s formal economy. Independent estimates—drawing on Western intelligence services, research institutes, and international organisations—suggest that the IRGC controls between 20 and 40 per cent of the formal economy. This figure is likely significantly higher once informal and sanctions-evasion activities are taken into account.
The IRGC also controls strategic choke points such as ports, border crossings, and logistics hubs. This constitutes a highly efficient apparatus generating substantial revenues through smuggling and parallel imports, particularly under the current sanctions regime.
The organisation’s extensive economic interests are so deeply embedded within the existing political system that they constitute a powerful incentive to resist political reform. Since the 1990s, the IRGC has built a vast economic empire spanning key sectors including energy, construction, transport, mining, telecommunications, finance, and import–export activities. It has also been awarded major infrastructure contracts—without competitive tendering—and now oversees much of Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure. As a result, the IRGC has become one of the most powerful economic actors in the country.
This creates a unique relationship between the IRGC and the clerical establishment. From an economic perspective, the IRGC functions both as a power base and as a survival mechanism for the regime. Its interests are inseparable from those of the political system itself, explaining why the regime increasingly prioritises the security apparatus over civilian economic development. The outcome is an economy in which the state effectively shares sovereignty with the military.
Conservative estimates suggest that the IRGC maintains between 125,000 and 150,000 active personnel in its regular forces, encompassing ground, naval, and air and missile units. In addition, the Basij militia is reportedly capable of mobilising up to 100,000 active volunteers.
The former commander of the IRGC, Hossein Salami, was reportedly killed during Israeli strikes on Iran in the summer of 2025. Since the summer conflict with Israel—and particularly the US “Midnight Hammer” strike on Iranian nuclear facilities—the Iranian military has appeared visibly weakened.
The current wave of domestic protests can therefore be added to an expanding list of crises confronting a regime that seeks to project strength externally—militarily and geopolitically—to compensate for internal fragility. This strategy appears increasingly unconvincing, both abroad and at home.
A widening generational divide
The present protests expose two fundamental cleavages. The first is the growing gap between state and society. Iranian society has evolved far more rapidly than the political system. Social norms, cultural practices, and political expectations have shifted at a pace the clerical regime has been unable—or unwilling—to accommodate.
By contrast, over the 47 years since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the political system has remained ideologically rigid and largely unchanged. This rigidity is further underscored by a second, decisive divide: a profound generational gap. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is now 86 years old and has held power since 1989, making him one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. He embodies continuity and ideological immobility.
His worldview is shaped by the 1979 revolution, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), and a perception of the West as a perpetual adversary. This worldview stands in stark contrast to that of Iran’s predominantly young population. Of Iran’s 90 million citizens, more than 60 per cent are under the age of 35.
This generation was born after the revolution and has no lived connection to revolutionary ideals or the traumas of the Iran–Iraq War. Instead, they have grown up with social media, global culture, and expectations of individual rights. The gap between the state’s ideological self-conception and society’s social realities is therefore not merely political, but also demographic.
Such a generational divide is bound to have consequences. In recent years, protest movements have been driven largely by young people who openly reject the symbols of clerical rule—most notably compulsory hijab—and its historical narrative.
It is within this tension between an ageing leadership and a youthful society pressing for a future the state apparatus is unable to deliver that the core of Iran’s structural crisis emerges: between age and youth, between revolutionary dogma and contemporary, individual-centred ideals.
Historically, Iranians have a long tradition of protesting against the regime since the Islamic Revolution. The current unrest is therefore not an anomaly, but a structural symptom of a political system that no longer represents its society. The clerical regime has so far survived repeated waves of protest. The question is no longer whether further protests will occur, but when—and in what form.
Top photo: Ncr-Iran.org
Disclaimer: For this translation I have used AI for specific translatory purposes. The original text in Danish is however not done with AI. The words are all mine