Handshake in the Shadow of Sanctions: The Geopolitics of Syria’s Return to Washington

By Yasmin Abdel-Hak

ANALYSIS//SYRIA/USA// When Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa walked up the steps of the White House last month, the choreography alone signalled a shift with implications far beyond Washington. The United States has not hosted a Syrian head of state in decades; for much of the past 15 years, Syria had been synonymous with civil war, sanctions, great-power proxy competition and geopolitical entanglement

For the first time in decades, a Syrian head of state was hosted in Washington; a striking reversal for a country long synonymous with civil war, sanctions, and geopolitical entanglement.

But this was no simple diplomatic thaw. It was a meeting shaped by necessity: Washington seeking strategic leverage in a region it once ceded to adversaries, and Damascus seeking the economic oxygen it desperately lacks.

A president forged in jihadism, prisons, and political collapse

Ahmed al-Sharaa is an unlikely statesman. In the early years of the Syrian conflict, he joined Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria’s al-Qaeda affiliate. For thousands of young Syrians at the time, al-Nusra offered not only ideology, but order, salaries, structure, and protection in territories where the state had evaporated.

Al-Sharaa served as a mid-level field operative, neither a commander nor a mere foot soldier. His involvement was shaped by the political vacuum, desperation, and survivalism that defined the early war years rather than doctrinal fanaticism.

By 2014, as al-Nusra splintered under internal rivalries and external pressure, al-Sharaa was captured by Syrian military intelligence. He spent almost a decade in regime prisons, including stints in Sadnaya — the Assad regime’s most notorious detention facility.

Prison reshaped him. It severed his ties to jihadist networks, exposed him to a spectrum of political and tribal detainees, and forced a shift from ideological absolutism to pragmatic negotiation.

His rise began as Bashar al-Assad’s regime collapsed in late 2024. Amid economic implosion, defections and foreign fatigue, Syria’s patchwork of militias, tribal leaders and local committees needed a transitional figure: Credible with armed groups, unaligned with Iran or Russia, untainted by the Assad system and not imposed by the West.

Al-Sharaa — released in a final-hour amnesty deal — fit that narrow profile. Within months he was elevated to the presidency, less through electoral mandate than through political exhaustion.

Why Washington shifted course

For over a decade, the U.S. treated Syria as an unsolvable crisis, a conflict without a viable interlocutor. Al-Sharaa’s presidency, however uncomfortable his past, offers Washington a point of contact it has not had since 2011

Three strategic calculations drove the invitation to Washington:

1. Sanctions have reached a dead end

Fifteen years of escalating U.S. and EU sanctions have impoverished Syria but failed to deliver political concessions. Sanctions have instead entrenched the Syrian economy deeper into Iranian and Russian networks.Washington now appears to recognise that isolation no longer yields leverage.

2. Counter-terrorism pragmatism

ISIS remnants remain active across central Syria. And here lies a paradox:
Al-Sharaa’s own past inside al-Nusra makes him simultaneously a troubling interlocutor and someone with intimate understanding of jihadist dynamics.

American intelligence agencies see value in structured — albeit limited — cooperation.

3. The return of great-power competition

Russia’s deep entrenchment in Syria and Iran’s network of militias across the Levant have underscored the cost of strategic disengagement. Washington might argue that re-engaging with Damascus is not an endorsement of al-Sharaa but part of a broader U.S. recalibration in a region increasingly shaped by rivals.

What Syria seeks

Syria’s economy is collapsing under the weight of war, sanctions and institutional decay. Infrastructure is shattered; the currency unstable; state capacity skeletal. Al-Sharaa needs access to reconstruction funding, partial sanctions relief and international recognition strong enough to stabilise his domestic position. A White House handshake, however controversial, reinforces his claim to legitimacy and signals to both allies and rivals that Syria may no longer be an untouchable pariah.

A region watching closely

Across the Middle East, al-Sharaa’s visit has triggered a mix of unease and opportunity. Iran views the American outreach with suspicion, fearing that a more balanced Syrian foreign policy could gradually dilute Tehran’s hard-won influence over Damascus. Russia, which spent years propping up the Assad regime militarily and diplomatically, is equally wary; any U.S.–Syria rapprochement threatens Moscow’s role as Syria’s indispensable power broker.

For Turkey, the implications are more immediate. A Washington–Damascus opening could complicate Ankara’s military posture in northern Syria and its long-running confrontation with Kurdish groups, raising questions about the future of cross-border operations and territorial control.

By contrast, the Gulf states — particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE — see potential advantage. They cautiously welcome the prospect of renewed American engagement, hoping that U.S. involvement could stabilise the Levant and eventually unlock the investment channels needed for Syria’s reconstruction. Their support, however, hinges on whether Washington is prepared to relax the sanction regimes that currently constrain regional economic initiatives.

Israel: Strategic anxiety beneath diplomatic politeness

No regional actor is watching the U.S.–Syria rapprochement with more quiet unease than Israel. For over a decade, Washington’s refusal to engage with Damascus aligned neatly with Israeli strategic preferences: a weakened, internationally isolated Syria — fragmented and dependent on Iran or Russia — posed fewer direct risks than a rehabilitated neighbour capable of asserting itself along the Golan frontier.

Al-Sharaa’s visit to the White House unsettles that calculus.

Publicly, Israeli officials have responded with practiced restraint, emphasising the importance of monitoring “regional developments.” Privately, however, the concern is sharper. A U.S.–Syria opening raises the possibility — however distant — of coordinated counter-terrorism channels, partial sanctions relief and eventually a more stable Syrian state with greater diplomatic reach.

From Israel’s vantage point, the danger is not al-Sharaa’s past in al-Nusra. It is the prospect of a Syrian state once again capable of negotiating, balancing foreign powers, and demanding attention from Washington.

There are three specific anxieties:

1. Iran’s footprint may adapt, not shrink

Israel fears that diplomatic reintegration could unintentionally legitimise a Syrian government still penetrated by Iranian-linked militias, allowing Tehran’s presence to be regularised rather than reduced.

2. The Golan Heights question could re-enter diplomatic conversation

Even if al-Sharaa avoids confrontation, U.S.–Syria engagement risks giving Damascus the political confidence to raise the Golan issue in international forums — something Israel has long considered closed.

3. Israel may lose its privileged position in Washington on the Syrian file

For years, Israel’s assessments shaped U.S. policy in Syria by default. A direct U.S.–Syria channel dilutes that influence and introduces a new layer of unpredictability into regional security calculations.

For now, Israel will watch cautiously from a distance. It does not oppose American engagement outright since Washington is still its most important ally, but it recognises a new strategic reality:
the Syrian file is no longer empty space where Israeli interests go unchallenged.

A Syria with even modest Western access becomes a diplomatic actor again, and for Israel, that alone is a significant shift.

A regional response played out in Lebanon

Israel’s unease over the U.S.–Syria opening is not expressed solely through diplomatic channels. In recent weeks, Israel has intensified its strike posture in southern Lebanon, targeting what it describes as Hezbollah logistical sites and cross-border infrastructure — a pattern documented by multiple observers.

While Jerusalem frames these operations as responses to immediate security threats, regional analysts suggest the timing reflects Israel’s attempt to shape the emerging geopolitical environment, especially as Washington reopens diplomatic channels with Damascus.

There are three dynamics driving this response:

1. Pressure on Iran’s regional network

With the U.S. signalling a tentative opening to Syria, Israel appears determined to remind both Tehran and Washington that it will not tolerate any consolidation of Iran-linked military infrastructure in Syria or Lebanon.

2. Containing Hezbollah during a diplomatic realignment

Israeli strategists worry that a more stable or internationally engaged Syrian state could indirectly strengthen Hezbollah’s political posture. By escalating pressure in Lebanon, Israel aims to maintain deterrence and prevent Hezbollah from capitalising on shifting diplomatic currents.

3. A message to Washington

Although Israeli officials know that al-Sharaa’s White House visit marks recalibration rather than rupture in U.S. policy, the uptick in military activity serves as a strategic reminder that Israel’s security front remains active and deeply intertwined with the Syrian file.

In this sense, Israel’s actions in Lebanon are not peripheral to the Syria story. They are a deliberate shaping of the regional chessboard. As Washington re-engages Damascus, Israel is making clear that its own security concerns must remain central to any emerging diplomatic framework.

A cooling between Netanyahu and Trump

The diplomatic opening to Damascus has also strained the long-standing political rapport between Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump — a relationship previously anchored in shared positions on Iran and strong rhetorical alignment.

For Netanyahu, the White House invitation to al-Sharaa represents an unwelcome surprise. Israel had assumed that Washington’s hard line on Syria was a stable feature of U.S. policy, particularly under a Trump administration broadly sympathetic to Israeli security concerns.

Three pressures are shaping the new tension:

1. Divergent threat calculations
Netanyahu views Syria primarily through the lens of Iranian entrenchment.
Trump sees a chance to pry Damascus away from Tehran’s orbit with limited diplomatic investment

2. Reduced Israeli influence over U.S. Syria policy
The White House’s direct outreach to Damascus signals that Washington is now willing to move independently of Jerusalem’s preferences — a subtle but significant shift.

3. Domestic political pressures
Both leaders face internal constraints: Netanyahu from a fragmented Israeli political landscape, wheres Trump faces pressures from the need to project foreign-policy decisiveness ahead of domestic political cycles.

A more transactional phase in U.S.–Israel relations

None of this signals a rupture. Israel still remains Washington’s indispensable regional partner. But the U.S.–Syria opening marks a transition from instinctive alignment to a more interest-driven, transactional dynamic, in which Israel must adapt to American manoeuvring rather than shape it.

In this emerging geopolitical environment, Israel’s military pressure in Lebanon and its diplomatic discomfort with Damascus’s rehabilitation are not separate stories — they are two expressions of the same strategic anxiety.

The limits of symbolism

The Washington visit does not resolve: Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe, its fractured security landscape, its internally displaced millions, nor the presence of foreign forces across its territory. But it does mark a reopening of the Syrian file in Washington after years of strategic neglect.

For al-Sharaa, the visit offers political capital and a narrative of international acceptance. A powerful counterweight to domestic factions sceptical of his authority. For Washington, it provides a rare opportunity to shape a space it once ceded entirely to adversaries.

The image of two leaders shaking hands beneath the shadow of sanctions captures the reality with clarity: This is diplomacy driven not by trust, but by mutual necessity — and by the geopolitical vacuum neither side can afford to ignore.

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince: The Broker Behind Syria’s Return

Behind the choreography of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s arrival in Washington stood a figure who never appeared in the photographs but shaped the entire diplomatic sequence: Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Riyadh has spent the past year positioning itself as the region’s indispensable deal-maker, and its fingerprints were all over the diplomatic pathway that brought a once-imprisoned, former al-Nusra figure into the Oval Office.

For MBS, Syria was never merely an arena of conflict but a potential theatre of Saudi influence, especially as Iran’s grip on Damascus appeared to loosen after Assad’s collapse. In the months following al-Sharaa’s rise, Saudi envoys—some official, some deniable—began exploring whether the new Syrian leadership might be coaxed back into an Arab and Western orbit.

Those conversations, conducted quietly and without formal announcements, eventually led Riyadh to act as the primary guarantor for al-Sharaa’s credibility. The Crown Prince assured Washington that the new Syrian president was neither an Iranian proxy nor a Russian dependency and that the Gulf was prepared to anchor reconstruction financing—if the U.S. would at least reopen diplomatic channels.

It was this Saudi guarantee, more than anything else, that made the White House meeting politically possible.

MBS in Washington: The visit that set the stage

Crucially, the Crown Prince’s own recent visit to Washington served as the diplomatic staging ground for al-Sharaa’s invitation. The trip, long anticipated and delicately choreographed, reintroduced MBS to an American political establishment that had previously kept him at arm’s length.

White house meeting
Wikimedia Commons — Meeting in the White House, Wikimedia Commons

Behind closed doors, discussions went far beyond bilateral issues. Syria featured prominently. The Saudis presented al-Sharaa as a pragmatic survivor rather than an ideologue, and as a leader with both the autonomy and vulnerability to be steered away from Tehran. They argued that if Washington wanted to claw back influence in Syria without military entanglement, now—under al-Sharaa—was the moment.

The White House listened.

The Financial Calculus: Gulf Money for stabilisation

The financial implications of the Crown Prince’s Washington trip were substantial. Gulf officials signalled readiness to assemble a multi-billion-dollar stabilisation fund, contingent on Western political cover and partial sanctions relief for Damascus.

This fund would not flow freely or unconditionally. Its purpose is strategic: to stabilise Syrian currency markets, to initiate urgent infrastructure repair and reduce Syria’s dependence on Iranian credit lines.

For Washington, this alignment of Gulf financing with American diplomatic aims was a rare convergence. It provided a path to influence Syrian reconstruction without direct U.S. expenditure.

For MBS, it was an opportunity to cement Saudi Arabia as the indispensable economic architect of the post-Assad order.

Political Outcomes: A New triangular alignment

Politically, the Crown Prince’s visit yielded something even more consequential: a new triangular understanding between Washington, Riyadh, and Damascus.

The implicit deal looked something like this: Saudi Arabia would act as guarantor and coordinator for Syria’s diplomatic re-entry into Western circles. Damascus, through al-Sharaa, would begin distancing itself from Iranian influence and open channels to Western security agencies. The United States would soften its blanket isolation policy and re-engage—cautiously, incrementally, but publicly.

This triangular alignment does not replace existing alliances, nor does it guarantee stability. But it marks a significant shift in how the region’s power centres relate to one another—and how they view Syria’s place within the emerging order.

For MBS, the political payoff is unmistakable: he has presented himself as the man who could bring Syria back from the diplomatic wilderness and who could deliver something no leader in the region has managed since 2011—a Syrian president sitting in the Oval Office.

It is geopolitical theatre at its most calculated, and Saudi Arabia now stands centre stage.

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These are some of the articles I have used for background:

Disclaimer: I have applied AI for translation purposes in this article

Top photo: Wikimedia Commons