Balance of power, missiles and regional warnings
ANALYSIS | IRAN | ISRAEL | MIDDLE EAST
When protests in Iran escalated in early January 2026 and the regime’s repression grew increasingly violent, the rhetoric from Washington hardened accordingly. President Donald Trump raised the prospect of military action and allowed signals of imminent force to circulate. Yet no strike followed. The explanation lies not in a single decision, but in a convergence of constraints: American military limitations, Israeli security calculations, and deep Arab scepticism about what the collapse of Iran’s clerical regime would actually mean for regional stability—particularly the balance of power.
For several days, a US strike appeared imminent. The evacuation of American personnel from the al-Udeid air base in Qatar and the closure of Iranian airspace added to the sense that escalation was close at hand. Yet at the last moment, Washington stepped back.
Trump’s retreat from the brink was not driven by hesitation alone, but by a more fundamental strategic question: what could the United States realistically achieve through an aerial campaign against Iran’s clerical leadership. And, more importantly, what consequences might such an attack unleash that Washington would be unable to contain?
America’s dilemma: easy to strike, hard to control
The choice facing the United States was not between action and inaction, but between a limited strike with no clear end state and the risk of escalation spiralling beyond American control. A military blow against Iranian targets might have demonstrated resolve, but it was unlikely to alter the regime’s core behaviour. Crucially, it would not have guaranteed a political outcome aligned with American interests.
This reflects a familiar American dilemma. A limited attack may be technically feasible, but not strategically decisive. Forcing regime change, or compelling Iran’s leadership to fundamentally alter its conduct, would almost certainly require climbing an escalation ladder Washington was unwilling to ascend, particularly given Iran’s missile arsenal, nuclear infrastructure and regional proxy networks capable of targeting US interests.
Missile defence systems are costly, resource-intensive and dependent on supply chains that cannot be replenished at the same pace as Iran can manufacture and launch missiles. From Jerusalem’s perspective, a limited American strike did not necessarily enhance Israel’s security; it may have undermined it.
Iran in 2026 is not Iraq in 2003. The country has deep regional ties, significant missile capabilities and a proven ability to strike indirectly through allies and proxies. Any American strike would almost certainly have been met with Iranian retaliation, against American bases, allies and critical infrastructure across the region. The key question in Washington was therefore not whether the US could hit Iran, but what would follow the day after.
Backchannels and the value of an exit
The decisive factor may ultimately have been quiet diplomatic contact between Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, backchannel diplomacy. Tehran reportedly signalled a willingness to temper its repression following the initial crackdown, including indications that planned executions would not be carried out. President Trump later cited these signals publicly as justification for refraining from military action.
Analytically, this matters because when an adversary offers an “off-ramp”, even a tactical and ambiguous one, the political cost of striking first increases. A president risks being asked why force was chosen when an alternative, however imperfect, appeared available.
Israel’s role: support, with reservations
Perhaps most striking was Israel’s relative restraint. For many observers, this sat uneasily with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s traditionally confrontational posture towards Iran. Yet Israel’s caution reflected not softness, but calculation.
Israel views Iran as its foremost strategic threat. Precisely for that reason, Israeli decision-makers are acutely sensitive to timing, capacity and consequences. A US strike on Iran would almost certainly trigger Iranian retaliation against Israel, either directly or via regional proxies. Moreover, Israel’s defensive capabilities, particularly missile defence, are deeply intertwined with American support and presence. Absent a large-scale US military commitment, Israel risked bearing the brunt of an escalation it had not initiated.
A further, more technical factor also loomed large: exhaustion. Missile defence systems are costly, resource-intensive and dependent on supply chains that cannot be replenished at the same pace as Iran can manufacture and launch missiles. From Jerusalem’s perspective, a limited American strike did not necessarily enhance Israel’s security; it may have undermined it.
Arab fears: chaos and a shifting balance
Signals from the Arab world were equally consequential. Several Arab governments worked actively to avert a US attack, not out of sympathy for Tehran, but out of fear of the consequences. For that reason, the use of regional bases for launching strikes was effectively ruled out.
For Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, Iran is both rival and neighbour. A US strike would not occur in a vacuum, but in their immediate vicinity. American bases, energy infrastructure and vital trade routes would quickly become potential targets for Iranian retaliation. Past experience has taught Arab governments that confrontations with Iran rarely remain contained; spillover is the rule, not the exception.
At the same time, many Arab states are pursuing ambitious economic transformation agendas. Stability has become a strategic objective in its own right. Even the risk of regional war could deter investment, disrupt energy markets and undermine the Gulf’s carefully cultivated image as a secure economic hub.
A post-clerical Iran—and a stronger Israel?
Beyond economic concerns lies a more sensitive and rarely articulated consideration: the regional balance of power. However unpopular Iran’s clerical regime may be in Arab capitals, it still functions as a structural counterweight to Israel.
Were the clerical regime to collapse as a result of external military intervention, there is no guarantee that a stable, pluralistic Iran would emerge. A weakened or fragmented Iran could instead leave Israel as the region’s unchallenged military power, combining overwhelming conventional strength, technological superiority and nuclear capability. For many Arab governments, this is not an attractive prospect, notwithstanding their hostility towards Tehran.
Thus, for much of the Arab world, the choice is not between a “good” and a “bad” Iran, but rather between a problematic status quo and an unpredictable power vacuum that could tilt the regional balance decisively in Israel’s favour.
Diplomatic signals therefore mattered. The fact that Iran managed to open a backchannel to Washington provided the Trump administration with a political off-ramp. Even limited, tactical dialogue can complicate the justification for military action, particularly when the stated objective is de-escalation rather than regime change.
Restraint as a strategical calculation
Trump’s decision not to strike Iran, despite having raised expectations among the Iranian public, was not an act of hesitation. It was a rational, if fragile, strategic calculation. The United States faced a geopolitical scenario without a credible follow-on plan. Israel was militarily exposed. Arab partners warned against regional destabilisation. And the collapse of Iran’s regime risked producing a power shift favouring Israel, one that Arab states were unwilling to accept.
Once again, strategic restraint prevailed. And once again, the Iranian people were left to bear the consequences.
Disclaimer: I have applied AI for this English translation of the original article in Danish
Top photo: Official photo of president Donald Trump, Wikimedia Commons